Statement delivered by Sweden at the 10th NPT Review Conference, Main Committee II, United Nations, New York.
Chair,
Sweden associates itself with the statement made by the European Union. Our general priorities for this committee are also reflected in the working paper presented by the Vienna Group of 10. Let me make some additional points in a national capacity.
The non-proliferation challenges facing us are many and much work is needed to continue to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime.
Sweden condemns in the strongest terms the unprovoked and unjustified aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, which is a gross violation of international law, including the UN Charter. Russia’s attempts to use nuclear coercion risk undermining non-proliferation efforts. Russian actions directly threaten the safety and security of Ukrainian nuclear facilities and impede the IAEA from fully and safely conducting safeguards verification activities in Ukraine, notably at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, which remains illegally seized by Russian forces. Nuclear and radioactive material and related equipment outside Ukrainian government control as a result of the Russian aggression, increases nuclear security risks, including the risk of illicit trafficking.
The situation with regard to Iran’s safeguards agreement remains a matter of grave concern. Iran is pursuing highly proliferation-sensitive activities with no credible civilian use, and IAEA verification is circumscribed since Iran stopped implementing the Additional Protocol last year. In his latest report, the Director General informed IAEA Member States that there are signs of nuclear material and related equipment having been shipped off to locations unknown. The Agency is no longer able to verify the correctness and completeness of Iran’s nuclear material reporting, unless Iran engages seriously in helping the Agency determine the fate of such material and equipment. Sweden calls on Iran to provide the IAEA with all the information it requires, and to implement the resolution adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors earlier this summer.
The full and effective implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is urgently needed in order to strengthen the NPT as well as international peace and security. Sweden regrets the United States’ decision to leave the JCPOA in 2018, and strongly supports all efforts, notably those facilitated by the EU High Representative as JCPOA Coordinator, to bring about a return of the United States to the agreement and the resumption of full JCPOA implementation by all Parties, including sanctions lifting. Sweden is deeply concerned about Iran’s continuing contravention of the JCPOA and the proliferation consequences they bring. Sweden calls for an immediate reapplication of the Additional Protocol as well as the voluntary verification measures foreseen in the JCPOA and commends the IAEA’s crucial verification work in Iran.
The nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), including the testing of ballistic missiles, constitutes a
serious breach of several UN Security Council resolutions and further increases tensions in the region. The DPRK must cease such activities. Sweden once again calls upon the DPRK to take concrete steps to dismantle its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programme in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. Efforts to support dialogue must be continued in order to achieve lasting peace and security on a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons. Sweden continues its engagement for a peaceful solution on the Korean Peninsula.
Nuclear-weapon-free zones provide important contributions to peace and security. Sweden welcomes the fact that such zones have now been established in Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, South East Asia, Africa, Central Asia and Mongolia. Sweden, like all States Parties to the NPT, is committed to the establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction. We look forward to productive deliberations on this and other regional issues in Subsidiary Body 2.
Mr/Madam Chair,
The role of the IAEA in verifying non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty is crucial.
Sweden underlines the importance of IAEA’s safeguards system and its continuous evolution and improvement. Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements together with Protocols according to the 1997 Model Additional Protocol constitute the current safeguards verification standard pursuant to Article III of the NPT. We also call on States Parties with unmodified Small Quantities Protocols (SQPs) to rescind or amend them as soon as possible.
The International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS), held in Vienna in 2016 and 2020, and the ministerial declaration then adopted, constitute important steps towards enhancing and strengthening nuclear security worldwide and counteracting the continuing threat of nuclear terrorism. The IAEA has a central role in this regard and is the depository of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment. We welcome the 1st Meeting of States Parties to the amended convention held in Vienna earlier this year and encourage all States that have not already done so to become party to the amended Convention and to ratify and implement the amendment as soon as possible. Furthermore, peer review mechanisms such as the IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions contribute to further strengthening nuclear security and building confidence. We encourage all States Parties to invite IPPAS missions regularly, to follow up the findings and to share the results.
Since the end of the Cold War, Sweden has been engaged in nuclear security cooperation with a number countries of Eastern Europe including Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and the Russian Federation. In response to the Russian aggression, Sweden decided to suspend its bilateral nuclear safety and security cooperation programme with the Russian Federation and Belarus and instead to increase the allocation of funds intended for nuclear safety and security cooperation with Ukraine by 30%. Sweden is also a strong supporter of the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund through regular extrabudgetary contributions.
Mr/Madam Chair,
Sweden is convinced that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing and that the pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty are interlocking parts of a coherent whole. It is crucial that all States that possess nuclear weapons undertake voluntary measures, in order to increase transparency and confidence in the effectiveness of security for military nuclear materials.
In conclusion, we underline the importance of universalizing the NPT and call upon all States that have not yet done so to join the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states and, pending their accession, to adhere to its terms.
I thank you.