Webinar on the US and MENA

The panellists initially addressed the question of the extent to which the MENA region still matters to the US and vice versa, given the rise of China and other geo-political shifts. There was agreement that US administrations, dating back to the George W Bush-administration, have been seeking to reduce American involvement in the Middle East, but without much success, since, as one speaker put it, ”something always comes up.” Negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme, emerging interventionism among the GCC-countries, and a host of other issues will most likely require continued US involvement in the region.

For the MENA region, the US still matters a lot, but the region ”has not internalized the fact that they are not as important as they used to be”, in the words of one participant, due to a decreased US dependence on Middle Eastern oil and a lessened appetite for engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Countries in the Middle East expect that events in the region will force the US to pay attention. At the same time, as one speaker emphasized, the region has realized that it cannot rely on the US as it previously did, given the record of Obama on Syria, Trump on Saudi Arabia/Iran, and Israel stating it will act independently of the Biden administration vis-a-vis Iran.

Greater emphasis on human rights but underlying US interests may still play a role

The speakers also agreed that the Biden administration will focus much more on a values-based foreign policy, with a central role for human rights and democracy – these are not considered “optional but are rather seen as critical issues”.  It will be a totally different policy-making style, and it was pointed out by Dr. Dunne that whereas Trump had his ”favourite dictator”, Biden has no intention of, or interest in, cozying up to authoritarian leaders, who no longer have a “best friend in the White House”. In relation to Saudi Arabia, Secretary of State Blinken, at the time of announcing sanctions, warned that the US would not tolerate any further harassment of or threats against dissidents and journalists, thus suggesting certain potential red lines.  Dr. Dunne reminded the audience of the fact that Congress has introduced some conditionality on the military aid package to Egypt, linking it to human rights (USD 75 million of aid is now conditioned on the release of political prisoners), which the State Department cannot waive for security reasons.

Yet there will always be tensions between the commitment to a values-based foreign policy and other US interests rooted in realpolitik and economic considerations, including access to oil. With continued attacks on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, and with the Houthis deploying more precise and advanced weaponry, Dr. Young questioned if the US would help defend Saudi Arabia; the Biden administration has not yet clearly stated if and how it will continue to abide by the Carter Doctrine – the commitment, dating back to 1979, to defend the oil-producing states in the Persian Gulf against external threats. Another example mentioned is the on-going discussion about the longer-term US force posture in the Gulf, including whether the American 5^th fleet should remain based in Bahrain, which makes America’s Gulf partners uncomfortable.

Limited appetite to transform the region

Panellists were cautious in their assessments of the new administration’s ability or willingness to push for transformative change in the region. While Dr. Dunne expressed a desire for the new administration to engage with the “incredibly difficult transition this region has to go through, post-oil and gas – and the need to build productive economics and governing systems”, she thought the end of oil and gas was too far away, and that the Biden administration would instead focus on China.

Dr Muasher explained that there were few instances in past where hard pressure had been deployed, with the exception of the George W Bush-administration and under Obama during the first few months after Arab spring. He added: “That kind of pressure is over. I don’t think the US is going to push Arab states to reform”, though the umbrella that Trump provided, which allowed Arab states to act without repercussions, has disappeared. The utility of US pressure was also questioned, since in the past, Arab states have launched cosmetic reforms, and then pulled back when pressure receded.

The importance of domestic pressure, for change to be sustainable, cannot be underestimated, and there was some optimism about the longer-term prospects for genuine reform, since regimes have lost two key tools for maintaining control: “the Arab spring limited the use of the security forces and the decline in oil prices has reduced the ability to buy off populations. The next 10-15 years may the last hurrah of Arab authoritarianism.”

Ambassador Youssef struck a more sombre note, pointing to the growing regional rivalry since the Arab spring, including tensions not only between rivals but also between traditionally close allies, including Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt. He also highlighted the failed states in Syria, Yemen and Libya, and the weakening of institutions, such as the Arab League, GCC, and OIC. Leadership and initiative are needed from the region, but is it capable or willing to shoulder this kind of responsibility?                             

Iran and the JCPOA remain key, while the prospects for the MEPP are uncertain at best

The participants broadly agreed that the Biden administration would push for a new nuclear agreement with Iran, and they discussed whether Iranian interference in the region would be on the table, as many members of congress have pushed for. Several panellists doubted that the US would prioritize this issue over the wider attempts to reach a nuclear deal. As one member of the panel put it, “If you link the JCPOA to other Iranian activities in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, it will take a decade to finalize.”

There was a consensus that the Biden administration’s plans for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remain unclear. With the signing of bilateral agreements between Israel and various Arab states (“the Abraham Accords”), there is an argument that the Oslo framework of “land for peace” has been undercut, since Israel apparently can get peace without giving up land. One panellist suggested that this spelled the end of the two-state solution. Another speaker pointed to a leaked US document on the MEPP, which suggested a “very timid and uninspiring approach”.

Advice to the Biden administration

In conclusion, in response to a question from the moderator, the panellists offered some advice, that does not necessarily reflect a consensus view amongst them, to the new administration: 1. Provide a clear statement on the willingness to defend Saudi Arabia against external aggression, including more support for defence around oil facilities; 2. Do not go back to seeking a negotiated two-state solution, but adopt instead a rights-based approach, making sure people on ground in Israel/Palestine enjoy equal rights; and 3. Rethink the highly militarized, securitized way of dealing with the region, including massive conventional arms transfers. In particular, the promise of F-35s, drones, and other military hardware to UAE as a reward for normalizing relations with Israel should be reconsidered.